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We analyze government interventions to alleviate debt overhang among banks. Interventions generate
two types of rents. Informational rents arise from opportunistic participation based on private information
while macroeconomic rents arise from free riding. Minimizing informational rents is a security design
problem and we show that warrants and preferred stocks are the optimal instruments. Minimizing macroeconomic
rents requires the government to condition implementation on sufficient participation. Informational
rents always impose a cost, but if macroeconomic rents are large, efficient recapitalizations can be
profitable.
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schnabl@stern.nyu.eduIt has been well understood since the seminal work of Myers (1977) that debt overhang can
lead to under-investment. Firms in ￿nancial distress ￿nd it di¢ cult to raise capital for new
investments because the proceeds from these new investments end up increasing the value
of the existing debt instead of the value of equity.
This paper asks whether and how a government that seeks to maximize economic e¢ -
ciency should intervene to alleviate debt overhang in the ￿nancial sector. We ￿rst show that
debt overhang in the ￿nancial sector can generate negative externalities at the aggregate
level. In particular, one bank￿ s decision to forgo pro￿table lending or investment opportuni-
ties (due to debt overhang) reduces payments to households, which can increase household
defaults and thus worsen other banks￿debt overhang. If the household sector is su¢ ciently
weak, this mechanism can generate equilibria in which banks do not invest because they
expect other banks not to invest.
If an economy su⁄ers fromsuch negative externalities, the social costs of debt overhang
exceed the private costs, and there may be room for a government intervention. By directly
providing capital to banks, the government can alleviate debt overhang and possibly im-
prove economic e¢ ciency. The goal of our paper is to characterize the optimal form of an
intervention under such circumstances.
In our model banks di⁄er along two dimensions: the quality of their existing assets and
the quality of their investment opportunities. Asset quality determines the severity of debt
overhang and missed investment opportunities generate welfare losses. The objective of the
government is to increase socially valuable investments while minimizing the deadweight
losses from raising new taxes.
We ￿rst show that the cost of government interventions comes in the form of ￿ macroeco-
nomic￿and ￿ informational￿rents. Macroeconomic rents occur because of general equilibrium
e⁄ects. These rents accrue to banks that do not participate in an intervention but bene￿t
from the rise in asset values because of other banks￿participation. As a result, there is
a free-rider problem among banks. Informational rents, on the other hand, occur because
of private information. These rents accrue to banks that participate opportunistically. In
general, macroeconomic rents imply that there is insu¢ cient uptake of the program, while
informational rents mean that there is excessive participation.
We analyze the design of intervention to deal both with free-riding and with opportunis-
2tic participation. To address free-riding, the government must condition the implementa-
tion of an intervention on su¢ cient participation by banks. The intuition for this result
is that banks have an incentive to coordinate participation because each bank￿ s partici-
pation increases asset values in the economy. By conditioning on su¢ cient participation,
the government makes each bank pivotal in whether the intervention is implemented and
therefore reduces banks￿outside options. In the limit, the government can completely solve
the free-rider problem and extract the entire value of macroeconomic rents from banks.
To address opportunistic participation, the government must request preferred stock
and warrants in exchange for new capital. The intuition for this result is that banks￿equity
holders receive informational rents if the ￿nancial sector is better informed about asset
values and investment opportunities than the government. Indeed, we ￿rst show that the
form of the intervention is irrelevant if the government and the ￿nancial sector have the
same information about uncertain asset values and investment opportunities. In this case,
the government can extract all informational rents by keeping banks to their participation
constraints using di⁄erent forms of intervention such as equity injections, debt guarantees,
or asset purchases.
However, if the government has less information about asset values and investment
opportunities than the ￿nancial sector, then the government can lower informational rents
by requesting equity in return for capital. The reason is that equity is costly for banks
with good investment opportunities because they have to share some of the upside of their
investments with the government. Thus, banks with good investment opportunities prefer
to invest without government support which reduces the cost of an intervention.
We show that the government can further reduce informational rents by asking for
warrants at a strike price of bank asset values without investment. Such a program is only
pro￿table for banks with good investment opportunities that do not invest in the absence
of an intervention, which is exactly the set of banks the government wants to attract.
In the limit, the government uses preferred stock with warrants to completely eliminate
opportunistic participation and extracts the entire value of informational rents from banks.
Finally, the government￿ s cost of the e¢ cient intervention depends on the severity of
the debt overhang relative to the macroeconomic rents. Severe debt overhang increases the
cost because the e¢ cient intervention provides an implicit subsidy to bank debt holders.
3Larger macroeconomic rents reduce the cost because they allow the government to extract
the value of investment externalities from banks. If the macroeconomic rents are small,
then the intervention is costly and the government trades o⁄the bene￿t of new investments
with the deadweight loss of additional taxation. If the macroeconomic rents are large, then
the government can recapitalize banks at a pro￿t.
We discuss three extensions of the model. First, the e¢ cient intervention is more likely
to succeed if the government starts the implementation with a small number of large banks.
The reason is that large banks are more likely to internalize the positive impact of their par-
ticipation decision on asset values and that a small number facilitates coordination among
banks. Second, we show that deposit insurance decreases the cost of the intervention be-
cause the government is partly reducing its own expected insurance payments. However,
deposit insurance does not change the optimal form of the intervention. Third, heterogene-
ity among assets within banks generates additional informational rents and, as a result,
equity injections become even more attractive relative to asset purchases.
We emphasize three contributions of our analysis. First, the conditional participation
requirement can be interpreted as a mandatory intervention. Our paper thus provides a
novel explanation for why governments may require participation in recapitalization e⁄orts
and why there seems to be insu¢ cient take-up in the absence of such a requirement.1 Second,
the preferred stock-warrants combination also limit risk-shifting and therefore emerges as
the optimal solution in other studies of optimal security design (Green (1984)). In our
model, banks cannot risk shift with their new investments since they are riskless as in
Myers (1977), but risk shifting occurs through the reluctance to sell risky assets.2 Our
paper thus provides a novel mechanism for the optimality of preferred stock with warrants
under asymmetric information. Third, other work on bank recapitalization mostly focuses
on bank run externalities on the liabilities side of bank balance sheets. In contrast, our
model focuses on investment externalities on the asset side of bank balance sheets. Our
model therefore provides a novel motivation for government intervention even in the absence
of bank runs.
1Mitchell (2001) reviews the empirical evidence and suggests that there is often too little take-up of
government interventions
2Selling risky assets for cash is formally equivalent to reverse-risk-sh￿ting. Our result that purchasing
risky assets from banks is expensive is based on this insight.
4Our results can shed light on the form of bank bailouts during the ￿nancial crisis of
2007-2009. In October 2008, the US government decided to inject cash into banks under
the Troubled Asset Relief Program. Initial attempts to set up an asset purchase program
failed and, after various iterations, the government met with the nine largest US banks and
strongly urged all of them to participate in equity injections. Even though some banks
were reluctant, all nine banks agreed to participate and the intervention was eventually
implemented using a combination of preferred stock and warrants. This intervention was
then o⁄ered to all other banks.
Our model extends the existing literature on debt overhang. Debt overhang arises
because renegotiations are hampered by free-rider problems among dispersed creditors and
by contract incompleteness (Bulow and Shoven (1978), Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), and
Bhattacharya and Faure-Grimaud (2001)). A large body of empirical research has shown
the economic importance of renegotiation costs for ￿rms in ￿nancial distress (Gilson, John,
and Lang (1990), Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994), Hennessy (2004)). Moreover,
from a theoretical perspective, one should expect renegotiation to be costly for at least
two reasons. First, the covenants that protect debt holders from risk shifting (Jensen
and Meckling (1976)) are precisely the ones that can create debt overhang. Second, debt
contracts are able to discipline managers only because they are di¢ cult to renegotiate (Hart
and Moore (1995)). Our model takes large renegotiation costs as given and analyzes how
to resolve debt overhang in this situation.
Our paper relates to the theoretical literature on bank bailouts. Gorton and Huang
(2004) argue that the government can bail out banks in distress because it can provide
liquidity more e⁄ectively than private investors. Diamond and Rajan (2005) show that bank
bailouts can back￿re by increasing the demand for liquidity and causing further insolvency.
Diamond (2001) emphasizes that governments should only bail out the banks that have
specialized knowledge about their borrowers. Aghion, Bolton, and Fries (1999) show that
bailouts can be designed so as not to distort ex-ante lending incentives. Bebchuk and
Goldstein (2009) study bank bailouts in a model where banks may not lend because of
self-ful￿lling credit market freezes. Farhi and Tirole (2009) examine bailouts in a setting
in which private leverage choices exhibit strategic complementarities due to the monetary
policy reaction. Corbett and Mitchell (2000) discuss the importance of reputation in a
5setting where a bank￿ s decision to participate in a government intervention is a signal
about asset values, and Philippon and Skreta (2009) formally analyze optimal interventions
when outside options are endogenous and information-sensitive. Mitchell (2001) analyzes
interventions when there is both hidden actions and hidden information. Landier and Ueda
(2009) provide an overview of policy options for bank restructuring. Bhattacharya and
Nyborg (2010) examine bank bailouts in a model where the government wants to eliminate
bank credit risk. In contrast, our paper focuses on the form of e¢ cient recapitalization
under debt overhang.
Two other theoretical papers share our focus on debt overhang in the ￿nancial sector.
Kocherlakota (2009) analyzes a model where it is the insurance provided by the government
that generates debt overhang. He analyzes the optimal form of government intervention and
￿nds an equivalence result similar to our symmetric information equivalence theorem. Our
papers di⁄er because we focus on debt overhang generated within the private sector and we
consider the problem of endogenous selection into the government￿ s programs. In Diamond
and Rajan (2009) as in our model, debt overhang makes banks unwilling to sell their toxic
assets. In e⁄ect, refusing to sell risky assets for safe cash is a form of risk shifting. But
while we use this initial insight to characterize the general form of government interventions,
Diamond and Rajan (2009) study its interactions with trading and liquidity. In their model,
the reluctance to sell leads to a collapse in trading which increases the risks of a liquidity
crisis.
The paper also relates to the empirical literature on bank bailouts. Allen, Chakraborty,
and Watanabe (2009) provide empirical evidence consistent with the main predictions of
our model: they ￿nd that interventions work best when they target equity injections into
the banks that have material risks of insolvency. Giannetti and Simonov (2009) ￿nd that
bank recapitalizations result in positive abnormal returns for the clients of recapitalized
banks as predicted by our debt overhang model. Glasserman and Wang (2009) develop
a contingent claims framework to estimate market values of securities issued during bank
recapitalizations such as preferred stock and warrants.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 sets up the formal model. Section 2 solves for
the decentralized equilibrium with and without debt overhang. Section 3 analyzes macro-
economic rents. Section 4 analyzes informational rents. Section 5 describes two extensions
6to our baseline model. Section 6 discusses the relation of our results to the ￿nancial crisis
of 2007-2009. Section 7 concludes.
1 Model
We present a general equilibrium model with a ￿nancial sector and a household sector. We
refer to all ￿nancial ￿rms as banks and we assume that banks own industrial projects. The
model has a continuum of households, a continuum of banks, and three dates, t = 0;1;2.
1.1 Banks
All banks are identical at t = 0, with existing assets ￿nanced by equity and long term
debt with face value D due at time 2. At time 1, banks become heterogenous along two
dimensions: they learn about the quality of their existing assets and they receive investment
opportunities. Figure 1 summarizes the timing, technology, and information structure of
the model.
The assets deliver a random payo⁄ a = A or a = 0 at time 2. The probability of a high
payo⁄ depends on the idiosyncratic quality of the bank￿ s portfolio and on the aggregate
performance of the economy. We capture macroeconomic outcomes by the aggregate payo⁄
￿ a, and idiosyncratic di⁄erences across banks by the random variable ". At time 1, all
private investors learn the realization of " for each bank. We de￿ne the probability of a
good outcome conditional on the information at time 1 as:
p(￿ a;") ￿ Pr(a = Aj";￿ a):
The variables are de￿ned so that the probability p(";￿ a) is increasing in " and in ￿ a. Note
that p is also the expected payo⁄ per unit of face value for existing assets of quality " in
the aggregate state ￿ a. The average payo⁄ in the economy is simply




where F" is the cumulative distribution of asset quality across banks. The variable ￿ a is a
measure of common performance for all banks￿existing assets and satis￿es the accounting
constraint:
￿ p(￿ a)A = ￿ a: (1)
7Banks receive new investment opportunities at time 1. All new investments cost the
same ￿xed amount x at time 1 and deliver income v 2 [0;V ] at time 2. The payo⁄ v is
heterogenous across banks and is known to the ￿nancial sector at time 1.3 A bank￿ s type is
therefore de￿ned by "; the bank-speci￿c deviation of asset quality from average bank asset
quality, and v, the quality of its investment opportunities.
Let i be an indicator for the bank￿ s investment decision: i = 1 if the bank invests at
time 1, and zero otherwise. The decision to invest depends on the banks￿ s type and on the
aggregate state, so we have i(";v;￿ a). Banks must borrow an amount l in order to invest.
We normalize the banks￿cash balances to zero, so that the funding constraint is l = x ￿ i.
We will later allow the government to inject cash in the banks to alleviate this funding
constraint. At time 2 total bank income y is:
y = a + v ￿ i;
There are no direct deadweight losses from bankruptcy. Let r be the gross interest rate
between t = 1 and t = 2. Under the usual seniority rules at time 2, we have the following
payo⁄s for long term debt holders, new lenders, and equity holders:
yD = min(y;D); yl = min(y ￿ yD;rl); ye = y ￿ yD ￿ yl:
We assume that banks su⁄er from debt overhang, or equivalently, that long term debt is
risky.
Assumption A1 (Risky Debt): V < D < A.
Under assumption A1, in the high payo⁄state (a = A) all liabilities are fully repaid (yD = D
and yl = rl) and equity holders receive the residual (ye = y ￿ D ￿ rl). In the low payo⁄
state (a = 0) long term debt holders receive all income (yD = y) and other investors receive
nothing: (yl = ye = 0). Figure 2 summarizes the payo⁄s to investors by payo⁄ state.
1.2 Households
At time 0 all consumers are identical. Each consumer owns the same portfolio of long term
debt and equity of banks. They also have various types of loans due to the banks at time 2
3As in the original Myers (1977) model.
8with face value A. These loans could be mortgages, auto loans, student loans, credit card
debt, or other consumer loans.
At time 1, each consumer receives an identical endowment ￿ w1 and they have access to a
storage technology which pays o⁄ one unit of time-2 consumption for an investment of one
unit of time-1 endowment. Consumers can also lend to banks. Consumers are still identical
at time 1 and we consider a symmetric equilibrium where they make the same investment
decisions. They lend ￿ l to banks and they store ￿ w1 ￿ ￿ l. At time 2 they receive income w2
which is heterogenous and random across households. Let ￿ ye, ￿ yD, and ￿ yl be the aggregate
payments to holders of equity, long term debt, and short term debt. The total income of
the household is therefore:
n2 =
￿ w1 ￿ ￿ l | {z } + w2 |{z} + ￿ ye + ￿ yD + ￿ yl
| {z }
safe storage risky labor income ￿nancial income
(2)
The household defaults if and only if n2 < A. There are no direct deadweight losses of
default so the bank recovers n2 in case of default. The aggregate payments (or average




Note that the mapping from household debt to bank assets endogenizes the aggregate payo⁄
￿ a but leaves room for heterogeneity of banks￿assets quality captured by the parameter ".
This heterogeneity is needed to analyze the consequences of varying quality of assets across
banks. Finally, we need to impose the market clearing conditions. Let I be the set of banks
that invest at time 1: I ￿ f(";v) j i = 1g. Aggregate investment at time 1 must satisfy
￿ l = ￿ x(I) ￿ x
RR
I
dF (";v) and consumption (or GDP) at time 2 is:
￿ c = ￿ w1 + ￿ w2 +
ZZ
I
(v ￿ x)dF (";v): (4)
2 Equilibrium
2.1 First best equilibrium
We assume that households have su¢ cient endowment to ￿nance all positive NPV projects.
Assumption A2 (Excess Savings): ￿ w1 > ￿ x(1v>x)
9Under assumption A2, the time-1 interest rate is pinned down by the storage technology,
which is normalized to 1.
In the ￿rst best equilibrium, banks choose investments at time 1 to maximize ￿rm value
V1 = E1 [a]+v￿i￿E1
￿
yl￿
subject to the time 1 budget constraint l = x￿i, and the break even
constraint for new lenders E1
￿
yl￿
= l. This implies that ￿rm value V1 = E1 [a]+(v ￿ x)￿i.
Therefore, investment takes place when a banks has a positive NPV project, or equivalently,
when v > x.
The unique ￿rst best solution is for investment to take place if and only if v > x,
irrespective of the value of " and E1 [￿ a]. The ￿rst best equilibrium is unique and ￿rst-best
consumption is ￿ cFB = ￿ w1 + ￿ w2 +
R
v>x (v ￿ x)dFv (v). We can think of the ￿rst best as a
world in which banks can pledge the PV of new projects to households (no debt overhang).
Hence, positive NPV projects can always be ￿nanced. Figure 3 illustrates investment under
the ￿rst best. 4
2.2 Debt overhang equilibrium without intervention
Under debt overhang, we assume that banks maximize equity value E1 [yej"] = E1
￿
y ￿ yD ￿ ylj"
￿
taking as given the priority of senior debt yD = min(y;D). Recall that the idiosyncratic
shock " is known at time 1. With probability p(￿ a;") the bank is solvent and repays its
creditors, and shareholders receive A ￿ D + (v ￿ rl) ￿ i. With probability 1 ￿ p(￿ a;") the
bank is insolvent, and shareholders get nothing. Using the break even constraint for new














The condition for investment is p(￿ a;")v > x, which is more restrictive than under the ￿rst
best because of debt overhang. The investment domain without government intervention is
therefore:
I = I (￿ a;0) ￿
n





4Notice the equivalence between maximizing ￿rm value and maximizing equity value with e¢ cient bar-









. The maximization program for ￿rm value
is equivalent to the maximization of equity value E1 [y
e] as long as we allow renegotiation and transfer
payments between equity holders and debt holders at time 1.
10The index 0 in the investment set indicates that there is no intervention by the government.











Using (2) and (6), we can write household income n2 as:
n2 = w2 + ￿ w1 + ￿ a +
ZZ
I
(v ￿ x)dF (";v) (7)
With the exception of risky time 2 income w2; all terms in household income are identical
across households. The three unknowns in our model are the repayments from households
to banks ￿ a, the investment set I, and the income of households n2. The three equilibrium
conditions are therefore (3), (5), (7). We solve the model backwards. First, we examine the
equilibrium at time 2, when the investment set is given. We then solve for the equilibrium
at time 1, when investment is endogenous.
Equilibrium at time 2
Let us de￿ne the sum of time 1 endowment and investment as
K(I) = ￿ w1 +
ZZ
I
(v ￿ x) ￿ dF (";v): (8)
Note that K is ￿xed at date 2 because investment decisions are taken at time 1. Using
equation (8), we can write equation (7) as n2 = w2 + ￿ a + K. Using (3) we obtain the
equilibrium condition for ￿ a:
￿ a =
Z
min(w2 + ￿ a + K;A)dFw (w2): (9)
We now make a technical assumption:
Assumption 3:
R
min(w2 + ￿ w1;A)dFw (w2) > 0.
Assumption A3 rules out a multiple equilibria at time 1 Allowing for multiple equilibria
complicates the analysis but does not a⁄ect our main results.
The following Lemma gives the properties of the aggregate performance of existing assets
at time 2:
11Lemma 1 There exists a unique equilibrium ￿ a(K) at time 2. Moreover, ￿ a is increasing
and concave in K.
Proof. The slope on the left hand side of equation (9) is 1. The slope on the right hand
side is Fw ( ^ w2) 2 [0;1] where ^ w2 = A￿￿ a￿K is the income of the marginal household (the
di⁄erential of the boundary term is zero since the integrated function is continuous). There
is therefore at most one solution. Moreover, under assumption A3 the RHS is strictly
positive when ￿ a = 0. When ￿ a ! 1 the RHS goes to A, which is ￿nite. Therefore the
equilibrium exists and is unique. At the equilibrium, the slope of the RHS must be strictly





F ( ^ w2)
1 ￿ F ( ^ w2)
> 0







Since ^ w2 is decreasing in K, the slope of ￿ a is decreasing and the function is concave.
The shape of the function ￿ a is intuitive because the impact of additional income only
increases payment of households in default. Hence, if the share of households in default
decreases with income K, the impact of additional income K decreases.
Equilibrium at time 1
We can now turn to the equilibrium at time 1. We have just seen in equation (9) that
￿ a increases with K at time 2. At time 1, K depends on the anticipation of ￿ a because
investment depends on the expected value of existing assets through the debt overhang
e⁄ect. To see this, let us rewrite equation (8) as:
K(￿ a) = ￿ w1 +
ZZ
">^ "(￿ a;v)
(v ￿ x)dF (";v); (10)
The cuto⁄^ " is de￿ned implicitly by p(￿ a;^ ")v = x, which implies @^ "














5We can restrict our analysis to the space where v > x since from (5) we know that there is no investment
outside this range.
12This last equation shows that K is increasing in ￿ a since all the terms on the right-hand-
side are positive. The economic intuition is straightforward. When banks anticipate good
performance on their assets, they are less concerned with debt overhang and are more likely
to invest. The sensitivity of K to ￿ a depends on the extent of the NPV gap v ￿ x, the
elasticity of p to ￿ a, and the density evaluated at the boundary of marginal banks (the term
@p=@" is simply a normalization given the de￿nition of "). Figure 4 illustrates investment
under the debt overhang equilibrium.
The important question here is whether the equilibrium is e¢ cient. The simplest way to
answer this question is to see if a pure transfer program can lead to a Pareto improvement.
This is what we do in the next section.
2.3 Debt overhang equilibrium with cash transfers
We study here a simple cash transfer program. The government announces at time 0 that
it gives m ￿ 0 to each bank. The government raises the cash by imposing a tax m on
households￿endowments ￿ w1. The deadweight loss from taxation at time 1 is ￿m. Non
distorting transfers correspond to the special case where ￿ = 0.
Consider the investment decision for banks. Banks receive cash injection m. It is
straightforward to show that if a bank is going to invest, it will ￿rst use its cash m, and
borrow only x￿m. The break even constraint for new lenders remains r = 1=p(￿ a;"). If the












+ (1 ￿ i) ￿ m
￿
:
This yields the investment condition p(v￿m) > x￿m which de￿nes the investment domain:
I = I (￿ a;m) ￿
￿





Households do not care about transfers because they are residual claimants: what they pay
as taxpayers, they receive as bond and equity holders. We therefore only need to modify
the de￿nition of K to include the deadweight losses at time by replacing ￿ w1 by ￿ w1 ￿￿m in
equation (8). Conditional on K, the equilibrium at time 2 is unchanged and equation (9)
13gives the same solution ￿ a(K). At time 1 we now have:
K(￿ a;m) = ￿ w1 +
ZZ
I(￿ a;m)
(v ￿ x)f (v;")d"dv ￿ ￿m: (12)
The cuto⁄ ^ " is de￿ned implicitly by p(￿ a;^ ")(v ￿ m) = (x ￿ m). The system is therefore
described by the increasing and concave function ￿ a(K) in (9) which implies d￿ a = ￿ aKdK
and the function K(￿ a;m) in (12) which implies dK = K￿ ad￿ a + Kmdm.6
At this point, we need to discuss brie￿ y the issue of multiple equilibria. Without debt
overhang, K would not depend on ￿ a and there would be only one equilibrium. With
debt overhang, however, there is a positive feedback between investment, the net worth of
households, and the performance of outstanding assets. We can rule out multiple equilibria
when ￿ aKK￿ a < 1. A simple way to ensure unicity is to have enough heterogeneity in the
economy (either in labor income, or in asset quality). When the density f is small, the slope
of K is also small, and the condition ￿ aKK￿ a < 1 is satis￿ed.7 Since multiple equilibria are
not crucial for the insights of this paper, we proceed under the assumption that the debt
overhang equilibrium is unique.





1 ￿ ￿ aKK￿ a
;
and from (4), we see that consumption at time 2 satis￿es
d￿ c = dK(￿ a;m) =
Km
1 ￿ ￿ aKK￿ a
dm:
















dv ￿ ￿: (13)
The sensitivity of K to m increases in the NPV gap v ￿x and the density evaluated at the
boundary of marginal banks and decreases in deadweight loss of taxation ￿. Importantly,
the equilibrium always improves when ￿ = 0, which shows that the decentralized equilibrium
is not e¢ cient.
6We are using the standard notations ￿ aK =
@￿ a
@K and K￿ a =
@K
@￿ a .
7In any case, multiple equilibria simply correspond to the limiting case when ￿ aKK￿ a goes to one, and, as
will be seen shortly, they only reinforce the e¢ ciency of government interventions.
14Proposition 1 The decentralized equilibrium under debt overhang is ine¢ cient. Non dis-
torting transfers from households to banks at time 1 lead to a Pareto superior outcome.
Figure 5 illustrates investment in the debt overhang equilibrium with cash transfers. If tax
revenues can be raised without costs ￿i.e., if taxes do not create distortions and if tax
collection does not require any labor or capital ￿then these revenues should be used to
provide cash to the banks until debt overhang is eliminated. In such a world the issue of
e¢ cient recapitalization does not arise, since the government has in e⁄ect access to in￿nite
resources.
If government interventions are costly, however, we see from (13) that the bene￿ts of
cash transfers are reduced. The overall impact of the cash transfers can even be negative
if deadweight losses are large. In such a world, it become critical for the government to
minimize the costs of its interventions. This is the issue we address now.
3 Macroeconomic rents
We consider ￿rst interventions at time 0 when the government and ￿rms have the same
information about uncertain asset values and investment opportunities. This allow us to
focus on macroeconomic rents and abstract from informational rents. For interventions at
time 0, we show that the critical feature is to allow the government to design programs
conditional on aggregate participation. However, the form of the intervention does not
matter.
3.1 Government and shareholders
The objective of the government is to maximize the expected utility of the representative




E [￿ c(￿)] (14)
where ￿ describes the speci￿c intervention. Let ￿(￿) be the expected net transfer from
the government to ￿nancial ￿rms. We assume that raising taxes is ine¢ cient and leads
to a deadweight loss at time 1 equal to ￿￿(￿). The government takes into account this
deadweight loss in its maximization program.
15We assume the government can make a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er to bank equity holders.
Equity holders then decide whether they want to participate in the intervention. The
government faces the same debt overhang problem as the private sector, that means the
government cannot renegotiate the claims of long term debt holders. Moreover, we assume
the government can restrict dividend payments to shareholders at time 1. This is necessary
because under debt overhang the optimal action for equity holders is to return cash injections
to equity holders.
At time 0, banks do not yet know their idiosyncratic asset value " and investment
opportunities v: Hence, all banks are identical and when participation is decided at time
0, we can without loss of generality consider programs where all banks participate. To be
concrete, we ￿rst consider three empirically relevant interventions: equity injections, asset
purchases, and debt guarantees.
In an asset purchase program, the government purchases an amount Z of risky assets
at a per unit price of q. If a bank decides to participate, its cash balance increases by
m = qZ and the face value of its assets becomes A ￿ Z. In an equity injection program,
the government o⁄ers cash m against a fraction ￿ of equity returns. In a debt guarantee
program the government insures an amount S of debt newly issued at time 0 for a per unit
fee of ￿. The rate on the insured debt is one and the cash balance of the banks becomes
m = S ￿ ￿S.
To study e¢ cient interventions it is critical to understand the participation decisions
of equity holders. The following value function will prove useful throughout our analysis.
Conditional on a cash injection m, the time 0 value of equity value is:
E0 [yej￿ a;m] = ￿ p(￿ a)(A ￿ D + m) +
ZZ
I(￿ a;m)
(p(￿ a;")v ￿ x + (1 ￿ p(￿ a;"))m)dF(";v); (15)
In this equation, one must of course also recognize that in equilibrium ￿ a depends on m,
as explained earlier. The ￿rst term is the expected equity value of long term assets plus
the cash injection using the unconditional probability of solvency ￿ p(￿ a). The second term is
the time 0 expected value of new investment opportunities. This value is positive when the
bank￿ s type belongs to the investment set I de￿ned in Equation (11). Note that cash adds
an extra term to the expected value of investment opportunities because the cash spent on
investment is not given to debt holders at time 2. For bank equity holders, the opportunity
16cost of using cash for investment is therefore less than the opportunity cost of raising funds
from lenders at time 1.
3.2 Free participation
In this section we study interventions in which the implementation of an intervention is
independent of a bank￿ s decision. We refer to this setup as interventions with free partici-
pation:
De￿nition 1 An intervention satis￿es free participation if the program o⁄ered to a bank
only depends on that bank￿ s participation decision.
We ￿rst study an asset purchase program. Banks sell assets with face value Z and receive
cash m = qZ. It is easy to see that the government does not want to buy assets to the point
that default occurs in both states. We can therefore restrict our attention to the case where
A￿Z > D. After the intervention, the equilibrium takes place as in the decentralized debt
overhang equilibrium. We know that the investment domain in the equilibrium where all the
banks participate is I(￿ a(m);m) de￿ned in (11). From the perspective of the government,
we can de￿ne the equilibrium investment set as:
^ I(m) ￿ I(￿ a(m);m);
which recognizes that the cash injection determines the macro state ￿ a: Let T = ["min;"max]￿
[0;V ] be the state space. We then have the following Lemma:
Lemma 2 Consider an asset purchase program (Z;q) with free participation at time 0. Let
m = qZ. This program implements the investment set ^ I(m) at the strictly positive cost:
￿
free






(p(￿ a(m);")v ￿ x)dF(";v): (16)
Proof. The cost to the government is m￿ ￿ p(￿ a)Z. The participation constraint of banks
is E0[yej￿ a;m] ￿ ￿ p(￿ a)Z ￿ E0[yej￿ a;0]. Using (15), we can write a binding constraint as
￿ p(￿ a)(Z ￿ m) = m
ZZ
^ I(m)
(1 ￿ p(￿ a;"))dF(";v) +
ZZ
^ I(m)nI(￿ a;0)
(p(￿ a;")v ￿ x)dF (";v)
17From the de￿nition of ￿ p(￿ a) we then get the cost function ￿
free
0 (m). Finally, both terms
on the RHS of (16) are positive. The ￿rst is obvious. The second is also positive because
p(￿ a;")v ￿ x is negative over the domain ^ I(m) n I(￿ a;0).
The government￿ s cost under symmetric information has a natural interpretation in terms
of the two terms on the right-hand side of equation (16). The ￿rst term re￿ ects the transfer
of wealth from the government to the debt holders of banks that do not invest: debt value
simply increases by (1 ￿ ￿ p)m over the domain T n ^ I(m). The second term measures the
subsidy needed to induce investment over the expanded domain ^ I(m) compared to the
investment domain I (￿ a;0).
We can now compare asset purchases with equity injections and debt guarantees.
Proposition 2 Under symmetric information, the type of ￿nancial security used in the
intervention is irrelevant.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 says that an asset purchase program (Z;q) is equivalent to a debt guarantee
program with S = Z and q = 1 ￿ ￿. It is also equivalent to an equity injection program
(m;￿), where m = qZ and q and ￿ are chosen such that at time 0 all banks are indi⁄erent
between participating and not participating in the program. All programs implement the
same investment set ^ I(m) and have the same expected cost ￿
free
0 (m)
The key to this irrelevance theorem is that banks decide whether to participate before
they receive information about investment opportunities and asset values. The government
thus optimally chooses the program parameters such that bank equity holders are indi⁄erent
between participating and not participating. The cost to the government is thus independent
of whether banks are charged through assets sales, debt guarantee fees, or equity injections.
3.3 Conditional participation
We now focus on the participation decision. So far we assumed that banks can decide
whether to participate independently of other banks￿participation decisions. We now allow
the government to condition the program o⁄ered to one bank on the participation of other
18banks. We call this a program with conditional participation. In e⁄ect, the o⁄er by the
government holds only if all banks participate in the program. The key is that if a bank
that was supposed to participate decides to drop out, then the program is cancelled for all
banks. It is straightforward to see that the equivalence result of Proposition 2 holds for
conditional programs, and we have the following proposition:
Proposition 3 A program with conditional participation implements the investment set
^ I(m) at cost
￿cond
0 (m) = ￿
free
0 (m) ￿ M(m)
where M(m) ￿ E0 [yej￿ a(m);0] ￿ E0 [yej￿ a(0);0] ￿ 0 measures macroeconomic rents.
Proof. The government o⁄ers a program that is implemented only if all the banks
opt in. If they do, the equilibrium is ￿ a(m). If anyone drops out, the equilibrium is
￿ a(0). Let E [yg] be the expected payments to the government. The participation con-
straint is E0[yej￿ a(m);m]￿E [yg] ￿ E0[yej￿ a(0);0]. By de￿nition, we have E0[yej￿ a(0);0] =
E0 [yej￿ a(m);0] ￿ M(m). The cost to the government is mE [yg]. Using a binding partici-
pation constraint, we therefore obtain ￿cond
0 (m) = ￿
free
0 (m) ￿ M(m).
The key point is that free riding occurs because banks do not internalize the impact of their
participation on the health of other banks. The program with conditional participation is
less costly because the government appropriates the macroeconomic rents created by its
intervention. We can use equation (15) to study these rents. Let ￿p (") = p(￿ a(m);") ￿
p(￿ a(0);"). We then have
M(m) = ￿ ￿p (A ￿ D) +
ZZ
^ I(0)
￿p (")dF (";v) +
ZZ
I(￿ a(m);0)n^ I(0)
(p(￿ a;")v ￿ x)dF (";v):
This expression decomposes the macroeconomic rents to shareholders into three compo-
nents. The ￿rst term is higher repayment rate on assets in place, the second term is the
higher expected value of investments that would have been made even without interven-
tion, and the third term is the expected bene￿t of expanding the equilibrium investment
set. Finally, the costs of the conditional participation program can be negative when the
19macroeconomic rents are large. In this case, the government can recapitalize banks and end
up with a pro￿t. We can therefore summarize our results in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 The government must use a conditional participation program in order to cap-
ture the macroeconomic value of its intervention. Under symmetric information, the type
of security used in the intervention is irrelevant.
We note that the conditional participation requirement makes each bank pivotal for the
implementation for the program. This mechanism may be di¢ cult to implement when
there is a large number of banks and if some bank equity holders decide against participa-
tion for reasons outside of our model. Also, there exists an equilibrium in which no bank
participates because each bank expects other banks not to participate. To alleviate these
implementation concerns, the government should ￿rst implement the e¢ cient intervention
with a small number of banks. A small number of banks reduces the likelihood that banks
may deviate from the optimal participation decision and facilitates the coordination among
banks. The government should target the largest banks for participation because then the
program has the greatest impact on the macro state ￿ a for a given number of participating
banks. Moreover, the largest banks are more likely to internalize the positive impact of their
participation decision on the macro state ￿ a (because they are not complete price takers)
and thus are more willing to participate in government interventions than small banks.
4 Informational rents
In this section we consider interventions at time 1, when banks know their types but the
government does not. The macroeconomic rents that we have studied in the previous section
still exist but we do not need to repeat our analysis. For brevity, we study only programs
with free participation and we focus on the consequences of information asymmetry.
4.1 Complete information benchmark
We ￿rst discuss participation and investment under perfect information and derive the min-
imum cost of an intervention. We note that this setting is di⁄erent from the time 0 setting
where banks and the government have the same information but they still face uncertainty
20about asset values and investment opportunities. Instead we assume that the government is
perfectly informed about each bank￿ s asset values and investment opportunities. For exam-
ple, this would be the case if banks can credibly reveal their information to the government.
Under perfect information, the government simply decides which banks should partici-
pate and provides enough capital such that bank equity￿ s participation constraint is binding.
We can thus provide a general characterization of the minimum cost of any intervention
with free participation:
Lemma 3 Consider a program with free participation that implements the investment set





(p(￿ a;")v ￿ x)dF (";v):
Proof. Note that I (￿ a;0) is the set of banks that can invest alone, and ￿min is the set
of types that invest only thanks to the program. The best the government can do with
I (￿ a;0) is to make sure they do not participate. Voluntary participation means that equity
holders in ￿min must get at least p(A ￿ D). The government and old equity holders must
share the residual surplus whose value is
p(A ￿ D) + p(￿ a;")v ￿ x
Hence the expected net payments to the government must be at least
Z Z
￿min
(p(￿ a;")v ￿ x)dF (";v).
These payments are negative by de￿nition of ￿min, and therefore the lower bound ￿min
1 is
strictly positive.
A simple way to understand this result is to imagine what would happen if the government
could write contracts contingent on investment. For the shareholders of type (";v), the
value of investment is p(￿ a;")v ￿x, which is negative outside the private investment region
I (￿ a;0). If the government has perfect information, it can o⁄er a contract with a type-
speci￿c payment contingent on investment. The minimum the government would have to
o⁄er type (";v) would be ￿(p(￿ a;")v ￿ x). We de￿ne an intervention￿ s informational rents
as the subsidy provided to bank equity holders in excess of this amount.
21We note that the government cannot simply use observed assets prices to implement
the intervention because the expectation of an intervention may in turn a⁄ect prices (see
Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010) and Bond and Goldstein (2010)). Credit default
swap prices of US banks during the ￿nancial crisis of 2007 to 2009 provide clear evidence of
this issue. Most market participants expected some form of intervention if a crisis became
su¢ ciently severe and indeed the government intervened several times after credit default
swaps reached critical levels. Hence, it is unlikely that credit default swaps re￿ ected the
probability of default in the absence of government interventions.
4.2 Participation and investment under asymmetric information
We now examine participation and investment under asymmetric information at time 1. We
￿rst compare asset purchases, debt guarantees, and equity injections. The objective function
of the government is the same as in the previous section. The participation decisions are
based on equity value which is now conditional on each bank￿ s type (";v). The structure of
the programs is the same as at time 0, but the government must now take into account the
endogenous participation decisions of banks. Under free participation, banks opt in if and
only if E1[yej￿ a;";v;￿] is greater than E1[yej￿ a;";v;0].
There are several cases to consider: opportunistic participation, ine¢ cient participation,
and e¢ cient participation. Consider opportunistic participation ￿rst. It happens when a
bank takes advantage of a program even though it would have invested without it. We
de￿ne the net value of opportunistic participation as:
U (￿ a;";v;￿) ￿ E1[yej￿ a;";v;￿;i = 1] ￿ E1[yej￿ a;";v;0;i = 1]: (17)
Consider now ine¢ cient participation. It happens when a bank participates but fails to
invest. We de￿ne the net value of ine¢ cient participation as:
NIP (￿ a;";v;￿) ￿ E1[yej￿ a;";v;￿;i = 0] ￿ E1[yej￿ a;";v;0;i = 0] (18)
It is straightforward to show that the government should always prevent ine¢ cient par-
ticipation, and that it can do so by charging a small fee. We always make sure that out
program satisfy NIP < 0 for all types. Finally, e¢ cient participation occurs when a bank
that would not invest alone opts in the program. We de￿ne the net value of opportunistic
22participation as:
L(￿ a;";v;￿) ￿ E1[yej￿ a;";v;￿;i = 1] ￿ E1[yej￿ a;";v;0;i = 0]: (19)
We will see that U = 0 de￿nes an upper participation schedule and that L = 0 de￿nes a
lower participation schedule (hence our choice of notations).
The participation set of any program ￿ is therefore
￿(￿ a;￿) = f(";v) j L(￿ a;";v;￿) > 0 ^ U (￿ a;";v;￿) > 0g: (20)
Note that L > 0 and NIP < 0 implies that there is always investment conditional on par-
ticipation. The investment domain under the program is the combination of the investment
set I (￿ a;0) (banks that would invest without government intervention) and the participation
set ￿(￿ a;￿). With a slight abuse of notation, we de￿ne:
I (￿ a;￿) = I (￿ a;0) [ ￿(￿ a;￿): (21)
Note that the overlap between the two sets, I (￿ a;0) \ ￿1 (￿ a;￿), represents opportunistic
participation. Opportunistic participation is participation by banks that would invest even
without the program.
4.3 Comparison of standard interventions
We now compare the relative e¢ ciency of the three standard interventions (described earlier)
under asymmetric information. We study ￿rst the asset purchase program. The upper
participation curve (17) is de￿ned by Ua (￿ a;";v;Z;q) = (q ￿ p(￿ a;"))Z. Banks participate
only if the price q o⁄ered by the government exceeds the true asset value p(￿ a;"). This
is the adverse selection problem between the government and the ￿nancial sector. The
NIP-constraint (18) only requires q < 1, which is always satis￿ed by e¢ cient interventions.
The lower bound schedule (19) is given by La (￿ a;";v;Z;q) = p(￿ a;")v ￿x+(q ￿ p(￿ a;"))Z.
The lower- and the upper-schedules de￿ne the participation set ￿a
1 (￿ a;Z;q) from (20). The
expected cost of the asset purchase program is:
￿a
1 (￿ a;q;Z) = Z
ZZ
￿a(￿ a;Z;q)
(q ￿ p(￿ a;"))dF (";v): (22)
23Figure 6 shows the investment and participation sets for asset purchases under asymmet-
ric information. The ￿gure distinguishes three regions of interest: e¢ cient participation,
opportunistic participation, and independent investment. The e¢ cient participation region
comprises the banks that participate in the intervention and that invest because of the inter-
vention. The opportunistic region comprises the banks that participate in the intervention
but would have invested even in the absence of the intervention. The independent invest-
ment region comprises the banks that invest without government intervention. As is clear
from the ￿gure, the government￿ s trade-o⁄ is between expanding the e¢ cient participation
region and reducing the opportunistic participation region.
From cost equation (22) we see that an asset purchase qZ is less costly than an equivalent
a cash transfer qZ for three reasons. First, the independent investment region reduces
opportunistic participation without reducing investment. Second, the pricing q < 1 excludes
banks that would not invest. Third, the government receives Z in the high-payo⁄ state
which lowers the government￿ s cost without a⁄ecting investment. Let us now compare asset
purchases to debt guarantees:
Proposition 4 Equivalence of asset purchases and debt guarantees. An asset pur-
chase program (Z;q) with participation at time 1 is equivalent to a debt guarantee program
with S = Z and q = 1 ￿ ￿.
Proof. See Appendix.
The equivalence of asset purchases and debt guarantees comes from the fact that both
programs make participation contingent on asset quality p(￿ a;") but not investment oppor-
tunity v. To see this result, consider the upper-bound schedule. If q = 1 ￿ ￿; banks with
asset quality p 2 [1 ￿ ￿;1] choose not to participate. Hence, asset purchase program and
debt guarantees have the same upper-bound schedule. Next, note that the net bene￿t of
asset purchases is (q ￿ p); whereas the net bene￿t of debt guarantees is (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ p). Hence,
asset purchases and debt guarantees have the same lower bound schedule. The NIP con-
straint for asset purchases is p < 1, which is equivalent to ￿ > 0: The last step is to show
that both asset purchases and debt guarantees have the same cost to the government, which
24is true since they yield the same net bene￿t to participants. We can ￿nally compare debt
guarantees and asset purchases to equity injections:
Proposition 5 Dominance of equity injection. For any asset purchase program (Z;q)
with participation at time 1, there is an equity program that achieves the same allocation at
a lower cost for the government.
Proof. See Appendix.
The dominance of equity injection over debt guarantees and asset purchases comes from the
fact the equity injections are dependent both on asset quality " and investment opportunity
v. To understand this result, it is helpful to de￿ne the function X (￿ a;";m;￿) as the part of
the net bene￿t from participation that is tied to existing assets:
X (￿ a;";m;￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)m ￿ ￿p(￿ a;")(A ￿ D): (23)
In words, a participating bank receives net cash injection (1 ￿ ￿)m and gives up share ￿ of
the bank￿ s expected equity value p(￿ a;")(A ￿ D). To compare equity injections with other
programs, start by choosing an arbitrary asset purchase program. Then choose X (￿ a;";m;￿)
such that the lower-bound schedule of the asset purchase program coincides with the lower-
bound schedule of the equity injection program. Under both programs, equity holders at the
lower-bound schedule receive no surplus and are indi⁄erent between participating and not
participating. For given level of asset quality ", the cost of participation for banks with a
good investment opportunity v is higher under the equity injection program than under the
asset purchase program because the government receives a share in both existing assets and
new investments. As a result, there is less opportunistic participation with equity injections
than with asset purchases.
Figure 7 shows the participation and investment regions under the equity injection
program. The increase in cost of participation relative to the asset purchase program
has two e⁄ects. First, conditional on participation, the cost to the government is smaller
because the government receives a share in the investment opportunity v. Second, there
is less opportunistic participation because participation is more costly. As a result, equity
injections and asset purchases implement the same level of investment but equity injections
25are less costly to the government relative to asset purchases.8 The macroeconomic feedback
from equation (12) only reinforces the dominance of equity injection. Finally, we note
that participating banks receive informational rents in an equity injection program. It is
therefore straightforward to show that equity injections do not achieve the minimum cost
under perfect information.
4.4 E¢ cient interventions
We now analyze the e¢ cient intervention in our setting. In particular, we examine whether
an intervention with warrants and preferred stock can eliminate informational rents and
achieve the minimum cost under perfect information Under the e¢ cient intervention, the
government injects cash m at time 1 in exchange for state contingent payo⁄s at time 2. New
lenders at time 1 must break even and we can without loss of generality restrict our attention
to the case where the government payo⁄s depend on the residual payo⁄s y ￿yD ￿yl. As in
previous sections, we analyze cost minimization for a given investment set.9
It is far from obvious whether the government can reach the minimum cost under perfect
information. The surprising result is that it can do so with warrants and preferred stock.
Theorem 2 Consider the family of programs ￿ = fm;h;￿g where the government provides
cash m at time 1 in exchange for preferred stock with face value (1 + h)m and a portfolio
of (1 ￿ ￿)=￿ warrants at the strike price A ￿ D. These programs implement the same
set of investment domains as equity injections, but at a lower cost. In the limit ￿ ! 0,
opportunistic participation disappears and the program achieves the minimum cost:
lim
￿!0
￿1 (￿ a;￿) = ￿min
1 :
Proof. See Appendix.
8The ￿nal step in the proof is to show that the NIP constraint is the same under both programs. This
is true because the equity injection provides lower rents to participating banks than the asset purchase
programs. Hence, if the no-e¢ cient participation holds under the asset purchase program, it also holds
under the equity injection program. We can also show that equity programs at time 1 cannot be improved
by mixing them with a debt guarantee or asset purchase program. Pure equity programs always dominate.
The proof is available upon request.
9In general, the government can o⁄er a menu of contracts to the banks in order to obtain various invest-
ment sets. The actual choice depends on the distribution of types F (p;v) and the welfare function W but
we do not need to characterize it. We simply show how to minimize the cost of implementing any particular
set.
26Figure 8 shows the investment and participation region under the optimal intervention. The
e¢ cient intervention completely eliminates informational rents. The intuition for this result
is that the initial shareholders receive the following payment in the high-payo⁄ state:
f (ye) = min(ye;A ￿ D) + ￿ max(ye ￿ A ￿ D;0) (24)
Shareholders are full residual claimants up to the face value of old assets A ￿ D and ￿
residual claimants beyond. When ￿ goes to zero, the entire increase in equity value due
to investment is extracted by the government via warrants. As a result, the opportunistic
participation region disappears and only the banks that really need the capital injection to
invest participate in the program.10
Four properties of this optimal program are worth mentioning. First, we use preferred
stock because it is junior to new lenders at time 1 and senior to common equity, but the
program could also be implemented with a subordinated loan. Second, it is important that
the government also takes a position that is junior to equity holders. The warrants give
the upside to the government, which limits opportunistic participation. Third, the use of
warrants limits risk shifting incentives since the government owns the upside, not the old
equity holders (see, for instance, Green (1984)). Fourth, the use of warrants may allow the
government to credibly commit to protecting new equity holders. This may be important
for reasons outside the model if investors worry about outright nationalization of the banks.
We also note that our results describe the optimal intervention for a given investment
set. The optimal investment set is the solution to the government objection function (14)
and depends on the distribution of asset values and investment opportunities F (";v) and
the deadweight losses of taxation ￿. We note that implementing the optimal investment set
may require a menu of programs.
Our results on the e¢ cient intervention can be extended to alternative payo⁄structures.
It is straightforward to allow for uncertainty in asset values in the low payo⁄state. We think
this type of uncertainty is the most relevant for banks because banks usually hold loans and
debt securities with a ￿xed face value A and thus primarily face downside risk. It is clear
10In practice, there might be a lower bound on " because the government might not want to own the
banks. An approximate optimal program could then be implemented at this lower bound ". Similarly, the
rate h is chosen to rule out ine¢ cient participation (the NIP constraint). In theory, any h > 0 would work,
but in practice, parameter uncertainty could prevent h from being too close to zero.
27from the discussion above that such downside risk in the low payo⁄ state does not a⁄ect
banks￿participation and investment choices in the high-payo⁄ state and therefore does not
a⁄ect our results. We also examine more general asset distributions in the extensions of our
model.
5 Extensions
In this section we present three extensions to our baseline model. We consider the conse-
quences of heterogenous assets within banks and of deposit insurance.11
5.1 Heterogeneous assets within banks
We consider an extension of our model to allow for asset heterogeneity within banks. Sup-
pose that the face value of assets at time 0 is A+A0. All these assets are ex-ante identical.
At time 1, the bank learns which assets are A0 and which assets are A. The A assets are just
like before, with probability p(￿ a;") of A and 1 ￿ p(￿ a;") of 0. The A0 assets are worth zero
with certainty. The ex-ante problems are unchanged, so all programs are still equivalent at
time 0.
The equity and debt guarantee programs are unchanged at time 1. So equity still
dominates debt guarantee. But the asset purchase program at time 1 is changed. For any
price q > 0 the banks will always want to sell their A0 assets. This will be true in particular
of the banks without pro￿table lending opportunities.
Proposition 6 With heterogeneous assets inside banks, there is a strict ranking of pro-
grams: equity injection is best, debt guarantee is intermediate, asset purchase program is
worse.
The main insight from this extension is that adverse selection across banks is di⁄erent from
adverse selection across assets within banks. Adverse selection within banks increases the
cost of the asset purchase program but does not a⁄ect the other programs.
11Other extensions to continuous asset distributions and the sale of safe assets are available upon request.
They do not generate new insights that justify their inclusion in this section.
285.2 Continuous asset distribution
Our benchmark model assumes a binary payo⁄ structure for assets in place. We can gener-
alize our model to a distribution F (aj") over [0;1). As before, we assume that " parame-
terizes the quality of assets in place. We now discuss how our main results change in this
more general setup.
It is clear that Theorem 1 continues to hold. It is relatively easy to check that Proposition
5 also carries over to a general distribution of asset values. The issue of optimal interventions
under asymmetric information is more delicate. Consider a generalization of the program
described in Theorem 2. The government o⁄ers cash m in exchange for preferred stock with
face value (1 + h)m and a portfolio of (1 ￿ ￿)=￿ warrants with strike price max(a ￿ D;0).
The key di⁄erence is that the strike price of the warrants is conditional on the realized asset
payo⁄. The schedule of payo⁄s to the old shareholders is now
f (ye) = min(ye;max(a ￿ D;0)) + ￿ max(ye ￿ max(a ￿ D;0);0)
and total shareholder payo⁄ is
ye = max(a ￿ D + i ￿ (v ￿ rx + (r ￿ 1)m) ￿ hm;0)
where r is the break even rate conditional on ";v and m (in the binary case, it was simply
r = 1=p"). The NIP constraint is h > 0 and for simplicity we take the limit h ! 0. The
￿rst key point is that E [ye] is increasing in i if and only if v + (r ￿ 1)m > rx. This pins
down the investment constraint conditional on participation. For any ￿ > 0 it also pins
down the lower participation schedule L(";v;￿) = 0. By not participating, these types get
max(a ￿ D;0). It is easy to check that they prefer to participate (and invest) if and only
if v + (r ￿ 1)m > rx.
Consider now the upper participation schedule U (";v;￿) = 0. These types invest alone
and a fortiori with the help of the government. For these types, ye > max(a ￿ D;0) so
f (ye) = max(a ￿ D;0) + ￿ max(ye ￿ max(a ￿ D;0);0). As we decrease ￿ towards 0, the
schedule f (ye) becomes max(a ￿ D;0) which is the payo⁄without investment. It is strictly
lower than the outside option of any type that would invest alone. In other words, in the
(";v) space, the schedule U (";v;￿) = 0 converges to the schedule L(";v;?) = 0 and oppor-
tunistic participation disappears. By the same argument, the rents of all participating types
29also disappear since their payo⁄f (ye) converges to their outside option max(a ￿ D;0). We
therefore obtain our last result:
Proposition 7 Theorem 1 and Proposition 5 hold for any asset distribution. Theorem 2
holds when the strike price of the warrants is set ex-post to max(a ￿ D;0).
The key point of the implementation is that banks whose assets perform well ex-post
are rewarded by a lower dilution of their equity. Technically, by adjusting the strike price
based on the realized asset value a, the government can provide the same incentives as in the
model with binary asset payo⁄s. While the security design is not standard, it is perfectly
consistent with the assumptions we have made regarding information and contracts. If
assets trade, the government only need to use ex-post market prices. Even if assets do not
trade, the government can implement the optimal intervention by buying a small random
sample of assets, observe the ex-post performance, and set the strike price accordingly.
5.3 Deposit insurance
Suppose long term debt consists of two types of debt: deposits ￿ and unsecured long term
debt B such that
D = ￿ + B:
Suppose that the government provides insurance for deposit holders and that deposit holders
have priority over unsecured debt holders. Then the payo⁄s are are:




Proposition 8 The costs of time 0 and time 1 programs decrease. The equivalence results
and ranking of both time 0 and time 1 programs remain unchanged.
Proof. See Appendix.
30The intuition is that the government has to pay out deposit insurance in the low-payo⁄
state. Hence, every cash injection lowers the expected cost of deposit insurance in the low-
payo⁄ state one-for-one. As a result, the government recoups the cash injection both in the
high- and low-payo⁄ state. Put di⁄erently, a cash injection represents a wealth transfer to
depositors and, because of deposit insurance, a wealth transfer to the government. Hence,
the equivalence results and the ranking of interventions remain unchanged..
6 Discussion of ￿nancial crisis of 2007/09
The ￿nancial crisis of 2007-2009 has underlined the importance of debt overhang. There is
agreement among many observers that debt overhang is an important reason for the decline
in lending and investment during the crisis (see Allen, Bhattacharya, Rajan, and Schoar
(2008) and Fama (2009), among others).
For example, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2008) show that new lending was 68% lower in
the three-month period around the Lehman bankruptcy relative to the three-month period
before the Lehman bankruptcy. Using cross-sectional variation in bank access to deposit
￿nancing, the authors show that the reduction in lending re￿ ects a reduction in credit
supply by banks rather than a reduction in credit demand by borrowers.
The crisis has also shown the di¢ culty of ￿nding e⁄ective solutions to the debt overhang
problem. Several experts have expressed concerns that existing bankruptcy procedures for
￿nancial institutions are insu¢ cient for reorganizing the capital structure. As an alterna-
tive, Zingales (2008) argues for a law change that allows for forced debt-for-equity swaps.
Coates and Scharfstein (2009) suggest to restructure bank holding companies instead of
bank subsidiaries. Ayotte and Skeel (2009) argue that Chapter 11 proceedings are ade-
quate if managed properly by the government. Assuming that restructuring can be carried
e⁄ectively, these approaches reduce debt overhang at low cost to the government. However,
Swagel (2009) argues that the government lacks the legal authority to force restructuring
and that changing bankruptcy procedures is politically infeasible once banks are in ￿nancial
distress.
Moreover, concerns for systemic risk and contagion make it di¢ cult to restructure ￿nan-
cial balance sheets in the midst of a ￿nancial crisis. Aside from the costs of its own failure,
31the bankruptcy of a large ￿nancial institution may trigger further bankruptcies because of
counterparty risks and runs by creditors. For example, Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen
(2008) emphasize the role of counterparty risk in the interbank market.
The government may therefore decide to avoid restructuring because there is a positive
probability of a breakdown of the entire ￿nancial system. Even if the government decides to
let some institutions restructure, the government also has to address debt overhang among
the ￿nancial institutions that do not restructure. In fact, even proponents of restructuring
suggest to rank banks based on their ￿nancial health and only restructure banks below a cut-
o⁄. Hence, independent of whether the government restructures some banks, the optimal
form of government intervention outside restructuring remains an important question.
Surprisingly however, while there is at least some agreement regarding the diagnostic
(debt overhang), there is considerable disagreement about the optimal form of government
intervention outside restructuring. The original bailout plan proposed by former Treasury
Secretary Paulson favors asset purchases over other forms of interventions. Stiglitz (2008)
argues that equity injections are preferable to asset purchases because the government can
participate in the upside if ￿nancial institutions recover. Soros (2009a) also favors equity
injections over asset purchases because otherwise banks sell their least valuable assets to the
government. Diamond, Kaplan, Kashyap, Rajan, and Thaler (2008) argue that the optimal
government policy should be a combination of both asset purchases and equity injections
because asset purchases establish prices in illiquid markets and equity injections encourage
new lending. Bernanke (2009) suggests that in addition to equity injections and debt
guarantees the government should purchase hard-to-value assets to alleviate uncertainty
about bank solvency. Geithner (2009) argues that asset purchases are necessary because
they support price discovery of risky assets.
Other observers have pointed out common elements among the di⁄erent interventions
without necessarily endorsing a speci￿c one. Ausubel and Cramton (2009) argue that both
asset purchases and equity injections require to put a price on hard-to-value assets. Be-
bchuk (2008) argues that both asset purchases and equity injections have to be conducted
at market values to avoid overpaying for bad assets. Soros (2009b) argues that bank recapi-
talization has to be compulsory rather than voluntary. Kashyap and Hoshi (2008) compare
the ￿nancial crisis of 2007-2009 with the Japanese banking crisis and argue that in Japan
32both asset purchases and capital injections failed because the programs were too small.
Scharfstein and Stein (2008) argue that government interventions should restrict banks
from paying dividends because, if there is debt overhang, equity holders favor immediate
payouts over new investment. Acharya and Backus (2009) suggest that public lender of last
resort interventions would be less costly if they borrowed some of the standard tools used
in private contracts for lines of credit.
We believe our results in this paper make three contributions to this debate. First,
we believe an analytical approach to this question is helpful because it allows the govern-
ment to implement a principled approach in which ￿nancial institutions are treated equally
and government actions are predictable. This approach is preferable to a trial-and-error
approach in which the government adjust interventions depending on current market condi-
tions and tailors interventions to requests of individual ￿nancial institutions. In fact, such
a trial-and-error approach may create more uncertainty for private investors, which makes
them even less willing to invest. Uncertainty also generates an option to wait for future
interventions, which further undermines private recapitalizations. Moreover, tailor-made
interventions are more likely to be in￿ uenced and distorted by powerful incumbents (see
Hart and Zingales (2008), Johnson (2009)).
Second, we distinguish the economic forces that matter from the ones that do not by
providing a benchmark in which the form of government interventions is irrelevant. Under
symmetric information, all interventions implement the same level of lending at the same
expected costs. In contrast, under asymmetric information buying equity dominates other
forms of intervention because buying equity reduces the extent of adverse selection across
banks. Our analysis also shows how the government can use warrants to minimize the
expected cost to taxpayers, an important element which has not been emphasized in the
public debate on the ￿nancial crisis. Interestingly, Swagel (2009) notes that the terms
of the Capital Purchase Program, the ￿rst round of government intervention, consisted of
providing a loan in exchange for preferred stock and warrants. This structure is qualitatively
consistent with the optimal intervention.
Third, our analysis clari￿es why government interventions are costly. Under symmetric
information, equity holders are held to their participation constraint but debt holders receive
an implicit transfer. Hence, the same economic force that generates debt overhang in
33the ￿rst place, also generate the cost to the government. Under asymmetric information,
participating banks receive informational rents because otherwise they would choose not
to participate. Hence, under asymmetric information government interventions are costly
because the government has to recapitalize at above market rates.
Our analysis focuses on one speci￿c market failure, debt overhang, and its negative
consequences on lending and investment. We have emphasized the importance of asymmet-
ric information between the government and the private sector, but we have maintained
the assumption of symmetric information within the private sector. Philippon and Skreta
(2009) solve for the optimal form of intervention when the market failure is adverse selection
among private agents. They ￿nd that debt guarantees are optimal and that the government
should always aim for pooling interventions where all banks participate.
Finally, we note that our analysis does not address why the banking system entered
￿nancial distress and whether government bailouts a⁄ect future bank actions. In our model,
we take debt overhang as given and rely on other research that links the ￿nancial crisis to
securitization (Mian and Su￿ (2009), Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010)) and the
tendency of banks to become highly levered (Adrian and Shin (2008), Acharya, Schnabl,
and Suarez (2010), Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2009)). Regarding the impact of government
interventions on future bank actions, we recognize that bailouts can create expectations
of future bailouts which may cause moral hazard. However, if the government decides to
intervene, then it is optimal for the government to choose the intervention with the lowest
costs. Also, the optimal intervention minimizes rents to equity and debt holders, so the
optimal intervention also minimizes moral hazard conditional on the decision to intervene.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the e¢ ciency and welfare implications of di⁄erent government inter-
ventions in a standard model with debt overhang. We ￿nd that government interventions
generate informational and macroeconomic rents for banks. Informational rents accrue to
banks that participate in an intervention but do not change their level of investment as a
result. macroeconomic rents accrue to banks that do not participate but bene￿t from the
rise in asset values because of other banks￿participation. We show that the e¢ cient inter-
34vention minimizes informational rents by using preferred stock with warrants and minimizes
macroeconomic rents by conditioning implementation on su¢ cient bank participation. The
￿rst feature allows the government to extract the upside of new investments and the second
feature reduces banks￿outside options. If macroeconomic rents are large, then the e¢ cient
intervention recapitalizes banks at a pro￿t.
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38Proof of Proposition 2
Cash injection
The government o⁄ers cash m against fraction ￿ of equity capital. The government recog-
nizes that the equilibrium is ￿ a(m) which yields the investment domain Ii (m): At time 0,
equity holders participate in the voluntary intervention if
(1 ￿ ￿)E0 [yej￿ a;m] ￿ E0 [yej￿ a;0]: (25)
The cost of the program to the government is
￿e
0 (m;￿) = m ￿ ￿E0 [yej￿ a;m]:
Because the investment domain does not depend on ￿, the government chooses equity share
￿ such that the participation constraint (25) binds. Using the participation constraint (25)
to eliminate ￿ from the cost function yields
￿e
0;free (m;￿) = m ￿ (E0 [yej￿ a;m] ￿ E0 [yej￿ a;0]):
Using expected shareholder value at time 0
E0 [yej￿ a;m]￿E0 [yej￿ a;0] = ￿ p(￿ a)m+m
Z Z
Ii(m)
(1 ￿ p(￿ a;"))dF (";v)+
Z Z
Ii(m)nI(￿ a;0)
(p(￿ a;")v ￿ x)dF (";v):
Therefore the cost of the government is
￿e
0;free (m;￿) = m ￿ ￿E0 [yej￿ a;m]
= (1 ￿ ￿ p(￿ a))m ￿ m
Z Z
Ii(m)
(1 ￿ p(￿ a;"))dF (";v) ￿
Z Z
Ii(m)nI(￿ a;0)





The government recognizes that the equilibrium conditional on intervention is given by the
function ￿ a((1 ￿ ￿)S). Using equation (15), we see that conditional on participation, the
equity value at time 0 is E0[yej￿ a;(1 ￿ ￿)S]￿￿ p(￿ a)S: If a bank opts out, equity value becomes
E0[yej￿ a;0]. Since participation only depends on m = (1 ￿ ￿)S; the government chooses the
program such that the participation constraint binds:
￿ p(￿ a)S = ￿ p(￿ a)m + (1 ￿ ￿)S
ZZ
Ii(m)
(1 ￿ p(￿ a;"))dF(";v) +
ZZ
Ii(m)nI(￿ a;0)
(p(￿ a;")v ￿ x)dF (";v)
The cost to the government is
￿e
0;free = (1 ￿ ￿ p(￿ a))S ￿ ￿S
Plugging the participation constraint into the cost function yields the expected cost ￿
free
0 (m)
de￿ned in equation (16) The programs is equivalent to an asset purchase program when
Zq = (1 ￿ ￿)S.
39Proof of Proposition 4
We omit ￿ a to shorten the notations but all the calculations are conditional on the equilibrium
value of ￿ a. We must show equivalence along four dimensions: (i) the NIP constraint, (ii)
the upper schedule, (iii) the lower schedule, and (iv) the cost function. Upon participation
and investment, equity value is
E1[yeji = 1;S;￿] = p(")(A ￿ D) + p(")v ￿ x + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ p("))S
Participation without investment yields
E1[yeji = 0;S;￿] = p(")(A ￿ D ￿ ￿S):
Now consider the three constraints:
￿ NIP: E1[yeji = 0;S;￿] < E1[yeji = 0;0;0] or
￿ > 0:
￿ Upper schedule: E1[yeji = 1;S;￿] > E1[yeji = 1;0;0] or
U (";v;S;￿) = (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ p("))S:
￿ Lower schedule: E1[yeji = 1;S;￿] > E1[yeji = 0;0;0] or
L(";v;S;￿) = p(")v ￿ x + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ p("))S
Using the notations of the asset purchase program, the participation set is ￿a
1 (S;1 ￿ ￿),
the investment domain is Ia
1 (S;1 ￿ ￿) and the expected cost of the program is
￿1 (S;1 ￿ ￿) = ￿S ￿ S
Z Z
￿a(S;1￿￿)
(1 ￿ p("))dF (";v)
Now if we set S = Z and q = 1 ￿ ￿, we see that the NIP constraint, the upper
and lower schedules, and the cost functions are the same as for the asset purchase
program. The two programs are therefore equivalent.
Proof of Proposition 5
Equity value at time 1 with cash injection m is:
E1[yej";v;￿ a;m] = p(￿ a;")(A ￿ D + m) + 1(";v)2I(￿ a;m) (p(￿ a;")v ￿ x + (1 ￿ p(￿ a;"))m)
We omit ￿ a to shorten the notations but all the calculations are conditional on the equilibrium
value of ￿ a. We ￿rst analyze the equity injection program at time 1. Upon participation and
investment, equity value (including the share going to the government) is
E1[yeji = 1;m] = p(")(A ￿ D) + p(")v ￿ x + m
Participation without investment yields
E1[yeji = 0;m] = p(")(A ￿ D + m)
Now consider the three constraints
40￿ NIP: (1 ￿ ￿)E1[yeji = 0;m] < E1[yeji = 0;0] or:
(1 ￿ ￿)m < ￿(A ￿ D):
￿ Upper schedule: (1 ￿ ￿)E1[yeji = 1;m] ￿ E1[yeji = 1;0] or:
Ue = (1 ￿ ￿)m ￿ ￿(p(")(A ￿ D) + p(")v ￿ x):
￿ Lower schedule: (1 ￿ ￿)E1[yeji = 1;m] ￿ E1[yeji = 0;0] or:
Le = (1 ￿ ￿)(p(")v ￿ x + m) ￿ ￿p(")(A ￿ D):
If we de￿ne the function X (";m;￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)m ￿ ￿p(")(A ￿ D) as in equation (23),
we can rewrite the program as:
Le = (1 ￿ ￿)(p(")v ￿ x) + X (";m;￿)
Ue = ￿(p(")v ￿ x) ￿ X (";m;￿)
The participation set is
￿e (m;￿) = f(";v) j Le > 0 ^ Ue > 0g:





(m ￿ ￿E1[yeji = 1;m])dF (";v):





X (￿ a;";m;￿)dF (";v) ￿ ￿
Z Z
￿e(m;￿)
(p(")v ￿ x)dF (";v):
The following table provides a comparison of the government interventions:
Asset purchase Equity injection
Participation ￿a (￿ a;Z;q) ￿e (￿ a;m;￿)
Investment I (￿ a) [ ￿a (￿ a;Z;q) I (￿ a) [ ￿e (￿ a;m;￿)
NIP-constraint q < 1 (1 ￿ ￿)m < ￿(A ￿ D)
Cost function ￿a
1 (￿ a;Z;q) ￿e
1 (￿ a;m;￿)
Now let us prove that the equity injection program dominates the other two programs.
Take an asset purchase program (Z;q). We are going to construct an equity program that
41has same investment at lower cost. To get equity with same lower bound graph we need to
ensure that:
Le (";v;m;￿) = Lg (";v;q;Z) for all ";v:
It is easy to see that this is indeed possible if we identify term by term: ￿
1￿￿ = Z
A￿D and
m = qZ. In this case we also have Ia (￿ a;S;￿) = Ie (￿ a;m;￿). The NIP constraint are also
equivalent since (1 ￿ ￿)m < ￿(A ￿ D) , q < 1.
Now consider the upper bound. Consider the lowest point on the upper schedule of the
asset purchase program, i.e., the intersection of Ue = 0 with p(")v ￿ x = 0. At that point
(e ";e v), we have p(e ") = q and e v = x=q. Using the fact that lower bounds are equal to zero, we
can write X (";m;￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p("))qZ for all ";v. This implies that X (~ ";m;￿) = 0,
and therefore Ue (e ";e v;m;￿) = ￿(p(~ ") ~ v ￿ x) ￿ X (￿ a;~ ";m;￿) = 0. Therefore the upper
schedule Ue (";v;m;￿) = 0 also passes by this point. But the schedule Ue (";v;m;￿) = 0 is
downward slopping in (";v), so the domain of ine¢ cient participation is smaller (see Figure
7) than in the asset purchase case. Formally, we have just shown that:
￿e (m;￿) ￿ ￿g (S;￿):
As an aside, it is also easy to see that the schedule Ue (";v;m;￿) = 0 is above the schedule
pv ￿ x = 0 so it does not get rid completely of opportunistic participation, but it helps.
The ￿nal step is to compare the cost functions ￿a
1 (q;Z) and ￿e
1 (m;￿). By de￿nition of the




(p(")v ￿ x)dF (p;v) <
X (";m;￿)
1 ￿ ￿








X (";m;￿)dF (";v) = Z
Z Z
￿e(m;￿)
(q ￿ p("))dF (";v)
Since q ￿ p(") > 0 for all (";v) 2 ￿e (m;￿), and since ￿e (m;￿) ￿ ￿a (q;Z), we have
￿e (m;￿) < ￿a (q;Z):
Finally, note that the the comparison is conditional on equilibrium ￿ a: However, the eq-
uity injection requires lower taxes and therefore lead to higher equilibrium level ￿ a, only
reinforcing our proposition.
Proof of Theorem 2
Consider the equity payo⁄s for a bank in the program:
ye = max
￿










In the good state, as soon as ye > A ￿ D, the warrants are in the money and the number
of shares jumps to 1 +
1￿￿
￿ = 1
￿. So the old shareholders get only a fraction ￿ of the value
beyond A ￿ D. The payo⁄ function for old shareholders is therefore:
f (ye) = min(ye;A ￿ D) + ￿ max(ye ￿ A ￿ D;0):
42Old shareholders are full residual claimants up to the face value of old assets A ￿ D and ￿
residual claimants beyond. Now let us think about their decisions at time 1.
The NIP-constraint is simply h > 0. The value for old shareholders conditional on
participation and investment is
E1 [f (ye)j";v;￿;i = 1] = p"
￿





￿ (1 + h)m
￿￿
The lower schedule (e¢ cient participation) is therefore
L(";v;￿) = ￿ (p"v ￿ x + m(1 ￿ (1 + h)p")):




A￿D , and that of an asset purchase with m = qZ and q = 1
1￿h. If we take
h ! 0 we get the lower bound of a simple cash injection program, with an investment set
simply equal to I (￿ a;m). In general, we have an investment set I.
The upper schedule (opportunistic participation) is:
U (￿ a;";v;￿) = ￿m(1 ￿ (1 + h)p") ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(p"v ￿ x)
When ￿ ! 0, the upper bound schedule fU = 0g converges to the schedule fp"v ￿ x = 0g.
In this limit, there is no opportunistic participation and
lim
￿!0
￿(￿) = InI (￿ a;0) = ￿min
Finally, the expected payments to the old shareholders converge to p" (A ￿ D). So the




￿1 (￿ a;￿) = ￿
Z Z
￿min
(p"v ￿ x)dF (";v) = ￿min
1 :
QED.
Proof of Proposition 8
Time 0 Programs
Full transfer: v < ￿
For simplicity, we suppress the macro state ￿ a in all expressions. The expected values of





= p(")￿ + (1 ￿ p("))m if (";v) 2 TnI (m)





= p￿ + (1 ￿ p)m +
Z Z
I(m)
(1 ￿ p)(v ￿ m)dF (";v):
43The expected cost of deposit insurance at time 0 is
￿F




= (1 ￿ p)(￿ ￿ m) ￿
Z Z
I(m)
(1 ￿ p("))(v ￿ m)dF(";v)
The change in the expected cost of deposit insurance as a result of the cash injection m is
￿F
0 (m) = ￿F
0 (m) ￿ ￿F
0 (0)
= ￿(1 ￿ p)m + m
Z Z
I(m)nI(0)
(1 ￿ p)dF (";v) ￿
Z Z
I(m)nI(0)
(1 ￿ p("))vdF (";v):
The net cost of government intervention is
￿ ￿0 (m) + ￿F




Note that this term is negative because the bene￿ts of incremental investments accrue to
the government.
Partial Transfer: ￿ < v





= p(")￿ + (1 ￿ p("))max(￿;m) if (p;v) 2 TnI (m)








(1 ￿ p("))(￿ ￿ max(￿;m))dF(";v)





(1 ￿ p("))(￿ ￿ max(￿;m))dF(";v):









Note that this expression is negative. The government cost is ￿F
0 (m)+ ￿ ￿0 (m): The results
apply to all programs because all programs have the same cost function at time 0.
44Time 1 programs
Full Transfer: v < ￿






= p(")￿ if (";v) 2 Tn(I (0) [ ￿1 (q;Z))









The expected cost of deposit insurance is
￿F
0 (q;Z) = (1 ￿ p)￿ ￿
Z Z
I(0)[￿1(q;Z)
(1 ￿ p("))vdF (";v)
The change in the cost of deposit insurance due to the injection is
￿F





(1 ￿ p("))vdF (";v)
The expected cost for the government is ￿a
1 (q;Z) + ￿F
0 (q;Z):
Partial Transfer: ￿ < v





= p￿ if (";v) 2 Tn(I (0) [ ￿1 (q;Z))















The change in expected cost of deposit insurance is
￿F
0 (Z;q) = ￿
Z Z
￿1(q;Z)=I(0)
(1 ￿ p("))￿dF (";v):
The cost to the government is￿a
1 (q;Z)+￿F
0 (q;Z): The results also apply to debt guarantees
at time 1 because asset purchases and debt guarantees have the same cost function at time1.
45Cash against equity at time 1
Note that we can compute the expected cost of time 1 cash against equity similarly to
the time 1 asset purchase program. The only di⁄erence is the participation region for
cash against equity ￿e (m;￿) and the participation region for asset purchase ￿
g
1 (q;Z). It
turns out that the change in the expected cost of deposit insurance ￿F
0 (m) is equivalent
under both programs because both in the full and partial transfer case the di⁄erence in the
participation region cancels out when computing the di⁄erence in expected cost of deposit
insurance. It follows that the relative ranking of programs is unchanged.

















































































Figure 8: Efficient Mechanism
p(ε)